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Chapters two to four trace the development of electromagnetic theory from Maxwell to Lorentz, showing how the dis-substantialization of the ether and the introduction of the notion of 'local time' gave rise to the investigation of Einstein as to the meaning of simultaneous events in different systems and the modern principle of relativity. The uniqueness of the latter consists in questioning the usual assumption that our clock is valid for all points of space, and that we know without further definition what we mean by simultaneous events in different places. The precise laws which enable us to pass from the time of one system to that of another moving with reference to it are known as the Lorentz transformations, and serve as the basis of the new non-Newtonian mechanics and of all that is valid in Maxwell's electro-magnetics. The remainder of the book (chapters five to ten) is devoted to working this out in detail.

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A History of Philosophy. By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB. New York, Henry Holt and Company; London, Williams and Norgate, n.d.—pp. 256.

This volume is No. 96 of the Home University Library. It covers the entire history of philosophy from Thales to the nineteenth century and accords at least a mention to nearly all the men whose names appear in the ordinary texts. To deal with such a subject matter in two hundred and fifty small pages calls for an extraordinary amount of compression, so much, in fact, that it is seriously questionable whether the result can justify the labor of the attempt. Some philosophical notables come off with a very scant treatment indeed. Hobbes, for example, receives only incidental mention chiefly in connection with Descartes, and Hume, aside from references in connection with Kant, is disposed of in two pages, less than is given to Heraclitus or Anaxagoras. Considering the requirements of the case, however, it is perhaps less surprising that the condensation has been violent than that it has not been more violent than it has. Whether even that part of the public which has the least interest in the technicalities of the subject can be expected to gain much understanding from an exposition so general, is another question. Since there are already a number of excellent short histories of philosophy in English, the need for the book is scarcely apparent. If the editors of the Library felt that completeness required them to furnish a history of philosophy, it would have been wiser to devote more than one volume to the subject, as they have done in the case of English political thought.

Assuming that the task had to be attempted in one volume, the author has done it well. The style is not only clear and free from technicalities, but is surprisingly lacking in unpleasant reminders of the condensation which the author has had to practice. If this effect is sometimes gained by devoting precious space to matters not strictly within the limits of philosophy, it is at least open to argument that a book of this kind gains more than it loses by this method. The interpretations follow, as might be expected, the traditional paths, but they are accurate in spite of generality and remarkably few important matters fail altogether of mention. The most doubtful aspect of the author's work is the liberty which he takes with the chronological order. This is due, no doubt, to the necessity of grouping the material about thinkers of first class importance, but it seems as if this end might have been secured while keeping closer to the normal order, with some gain in the clearness of the development and no loss of space. For example, the author quite rightly considers the early Greek philosophers according to their relation to Plato, and to this end he distributes the accounts of them through his exposition of the latter. The order in which they appear, however, is extraordinary: The Milesians, Heraclitus, Socrates, the Sophists, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Zeno, and Anaxagoras. The Atomists do not appear at all until after Aristotle and in connection with the Epicureans. In a later chapter a similar inversion places the Renaissance after the Reformation.

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L'intelligence sympathique. Par GUNDUMUR FINNBOGASON, docteur en philosophie. Traduit en collaboration avec l'auteur par André Courmont. Alcan, Paris, 1913.—16 mo, pp. 244.

This work, dedicated to Henri Bergson by an Icelandic disciple, contains an interesting development of the master's doctrine of intuition, applied by the author in an original manner to a specific problem. To comprehend another person intelligently as an individual one cannot merely regard him from the utilitarian point of view of one's own needs, or confine one's self to the abstract methods of science and classify him as a type. On the contrary, it is necessary to sympathize with him, and to share his feelings and emotions and modes of action, for it is these that make him an individual. The interpretation of the way in which it is possible for one to arrive at such a sympathetic understanding (*l'intelligence sympathique*) of the personality of another, gives the author his problem, and the title of his book.

The author's main contention is that this sympathetic understanding is gained through the psychological processes of imitation and suggestion. We can only understand the emotions of another by feeling them ourselves, and to do this we must consciously or unconsciously imitate his facial expression and other bodily manifestations of emotion, and so reproduce his emotions in ourselves. An emotion which we cannot thus reproduce we fail to understand. The same principle is involved in the interpretation of the individuality of persons whom we have never met,—whose acquaintance we form through their writings. We accommodate ourselves to their individuality by reproducing in ourselves their modes of feeling and action. The individual characters produced by poets and other artists, whether human beings, animals, plants, or personified inanimate objects, are created in accordance with similar principles. These laws also apply to the understanding and production of music, painting, architecture, history, biography, and all efforts to portray uniqueness